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des Eaux, and Societe d'Amenagement Urbain et Rural.
Some of the companies remained under British control.

The World Bank and The International Monetary Fund
have been pushing client countries toward privatization.
In Latin America these organizations have advocated
the “Chilean Model” of radical and rapid privatization.
In the Chilean case, the sudden privatization of water
resources resulted in a high degree of monopolization of
water supply by the national hydroelectric generating
companies to the detriment of the agricultural sector and
cities that must pay exorbitant prices for added water
supplies.

The water sector is the closest approximation to the
ideal “natural monopoly” of economic texts. The
required infrastructure is costly and specialized.
Duplication by potential competitors would be
prohibitive. Thus one cannot count on competition of
the usual sort to maintain reasonable prices and levels of
service. The British solution has been to establish (for
each of the privatized public service sectors) a very
strong regulatory office–the Office of Water Services
(OFWAT) in the case of water. OFWAT exercises its
control through “price cap” regulation, “yardstick
competition,” and public pressure through citizen
advisory groups.

The program of privatization of public services in the
United Kingdom provides us with the most extensive
record of privatization and its consequences. This
program was pushed dogmatically by the Thatcher
government, starting with British Telecom in 1983,
British Gas in 1986, British Airways in 1987, the water
and wastewater treatment sector in 1989, electric
production and distribution in 1990-91, and the railroads
in 1994. The results have been quite mixed, from
outstanding success in the gas, electricity, and telecom
sector to chaos in the railroads, and great public
dissatisfaction in the water sector.

The major result has been a strong (and outspoken)
public discontent with the private companies. Water
charges have increased from 100 percent to 200 percent.
The salaries of company directors have been very high
in comparison with similar industries, while the prices
of the company stocks (large numbers held by company
officials) have increased tremendously in anticipation of
The motivation for water sector privatization (besides continued high profits. (The average stock price for the
the market philosophy held by the Tory government) 25 water supply companies has increased by a factor of
was a backlog of maintenance and repair estimated to be ten!) The number of service shutoffs has increased
24 billion pounds that the government didn't want to dramatically – a social issue of great concern.
bear and the obvious need to raise water charges for
which the government preferred not to take the blame. Evaluation of the companies' performances has been
Prior to privatization in 1989, the water sector consisted confounded by the occurrence of two severe droughts
The companies clearly have
of ten major river authorities that provided water since privatization.
supplies, waste water treatment, and ambient water invested heavily in repairs and capacity expansion. A
quality management in the major river basins, major issue has been reduction of water losses through
supplemented by 25 historical water supply companies leaks. Residential users typically are not metered
serving local areas. Ownership shares for these entities because of the age of the systems and the earlier
were created and “floated” at quite advantageous prices plenitude of raw water, so that isolating leaks has been
to be sure that buyers would be found. The offerings difficult. Because of the severe control by OFWAT, the
were heavily oversubscribed and the successful buyers operations of the industry are more transparent and, to
were mostly the three large French water companies: some extent, more accountable. Eventually, after the
Compagnie General des Eaux, Compagnie Lyonnaise great backlogs of investment have been filled, there will
be more effective control of water charges. What will

46

prior to privatization, but the costs of the transition to
equilibrium are quite significant and should not be
ignored in weighing the privatization decision.

be the ultimate equilibrium of the industry?
Consolidation of companies is already underway.
What have we learned? Clearly, although privatization
doesn't work magic in the public service area, it has
been quite successful in those industries where the
technology is more “flexible” in the sense of permitting
multicompany use of facilities. In the water sector, a
loosely regulated public service has been replaced by a
heavily regulated private service. The natural monopoly
problem has not been overcome. “Price cap regulation”
and “yardstick competition” have proved more feeble
instruments than anticipated. The new equilibrium of
the industry will probably be superior to the situation
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